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Abstract—IoT devices are increasingly being implicated in
cyber-attacks, raising community concern about the risks they
pose to critical infrastructure, corporations, and citizens. In order
to reduce this risk, the IETF is pushing IoT vendors to develop
formal specifications of the intended purpose of their IoT devices,
in the form of a Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD), so
that their network behavior in any operating environment can
be locked down and verified rigorously.
This paper aims to assist IoT manufacturers in developing
and verifying MUD profiles, while also helping adopters of these
devices to ensure they are compatible with their organizational
policies and track devices network behavior based on their MUD
profile. Our first contribution is to develop a tool that takes the
traffic trace of an arbitrary IoT device as input and automatically
generates the MUD profile for it. We contribute our tool as
open source, apply it to 28 consumer IoT devices, and highlight
insights and challenges encountered in the process. Our second
contribution is to apply a formal semantic framework that not
only validates a given MUD profile for consistency, but also
checks its compatibility with a given organizational policy. We
apply our framework to representative organizations and selected
devices, to demonstrate how MUD can reduce the effort needed
for IoT acceptance testing. Finally, we show how operators can
dynamically identify IoT devices using known MUD profiles and
monitor their behavioral changes on their network.
Index Terms—IoT, MUD, Policy Verification, Device Discovery,
Compromised Device Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things is considered the next technological
mega-trend, with wide reaching effects across the business
spectrum [2]. By connecting billions of every day devices
from smart watches to industrial equipment to the Internet,
IoT integrates the physical and cyber worlds, creating a host
of opportunities and challenges for businesses and consumers
alike. But, increased interconnectivity also increases the risk
of using these devices.
Many connected IoT devices can be found on search engines
such as Shodan [3], and their vulnerabilities exploited at scale.
For example, Dyn, a major DNS provider, was subjected to a
DDoS attack originating from a large IoT botnet comprising
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thousands of compromised IP-cameras [4]. IoT devices, expos-
ing TCP/UDP ports to arbitrary local endpoints within a home
or enterprise, and to remote entities on the wider Internet,
can be used by inside and outside attackers to reflect/amplify
attacks and to infiltrate otherwise secure networks [5]. IoT
device security is thus a top concern for the Internet ecosystem.
These security concerns have prompted standards bodies
to provide guidelines for the Internet community to build
secure IoT devices and services [6]–[8], and for regulatory
bodies (such as the US FCC) to control their use [9]. The
focus of our work is an IETF proposal called Manufacturer
Usage Description (MUD) [10] which provides the first formal
framework for IoT behavior that can be rigorously enforced.
This framework requires manufacturers of IoTs to publish a
behavioral profile of their device, as they are the ones with best
knowledge of how their device will behave when installed in
a network; for example, an IP camera may need to use DNS
and DHCP on the local network, and communicate with NTP
servers and a specific cloud-based controller in the Internet,
but nothing else. Such requirements vary across IoTs from
different manufacturers. Knowing each device’s requirements
will allow network operators to impose a tight set of access
control list (ACL) restrictions for each IoT device in operation,
so as to reduce the potential attack surface on their network.
The MUD proposal hence provides a light-weight model to
enforce effective baseline security for IoT devices by allowing
a network to auto-configure the required network access for
the devices, so that they can perform their intended functions
without having unrestricted network privileges.
MUD is a new and emerging paradigm, and there is little
collective wisdom today on how manufacturers should develop
behavioral profiles of their IoT devices, or how organizations
should use these profiles to secure their network and monitor
the runtime behaviour of IoT devices. Our preliminary work
in [11] was one of the first attempts to address these short-
comings. This paper1 significantly expands on our prior work
by proposing an IoT device classification framework which
uses observed traffic traces and incrementally compares them
with known IoT MUD signatures. We use this framework
and trace data captured over a period of six months from
a test-bed comprising of 28 distinct IoT devices to identify
(a) legacy IoT devices without vendor MUD support; (b) IoT
devices with outdated firmware; and (c) IoT devices which are
potentially compromised. To the best of our knowledge, this
1This project was supported by Google Faculty Research Awards Centre
of Excellence for Mathematical and Statistical Frontiers (ACEMS).
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2is the first attempt to automatically generate MUD profiles,
formally check their consistency and compatibility with an
organizational policy, prior to deployment. In summary, our
contributions are:
• We instrument a tool to assist IoT manufacturers to
generate MUD profiles. Our tool takes as input the
packet trace containing the operational behavior of an
IoT device, and generates as ouput a MUD profile for
it. We contribute our tool as open source [12], apply it
to 28 consumer IoT devices, and highlight insights and
challenges encountered in the process.
• We apply a formal semantic framework that not only
validates a given MUD profile for consistency, but also
checks its compatibility with a given organizational pol-
icy. We apply our semantic framework to representative
organizations and selected devices, and demonstrate how
MUD can greatly simplify the process of IoT acceptance
into the organization.
• We propose an IoT device classification framework us-
ing observed traffic traces and known MUD signatures
to dynamically identify IoT devices and monitor their
behavioral changes in a network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: §II describes
relevant background work on IoT security and formal policy
modeling. §III describes our open-source tool for automatic
MUD profile generation. Our verification framework for MUD
policies is described in §IV, followed by evaluation of results.
We describe our IoT device classification framework in §V
and demonstrate its use to identify and monitor IoT behavioral
changes within a network. We conclude the paper in §VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Securing IoT devices has played a secondary role to innova-
tion, i.e., creating new IoT functionality (devices and services).
This neglection of security has created a substantial safety and
economic risks for the Internet [13]. Today many manufacturer
IoT devices lack even the basic security measures [14] and
network operators have poor visibility into the network activity
of their connected devices hindering the application of access-
control policies to them [15]. IoT botnets continue to grow in
size and sophistication and attackers are leveraging them to
launch large-scale DDoS attacks [16]; devices such as baby
monitors, refrigerators and smart plugs have been hacked and
controlled remotely [17]; and many organizational assets such
as cameras are being accessed publicly [18], [19].
Existing IoT security guidelines and recommendations [6]–
[9] are largely qualitative and subject to human interpre-
tation, and therefore unsuitable for automated and rigorous
application. The IETF MUD specification [10] on the other
hand defines a formal framework to capture device run-time
behavior, and is therefore amenable to rigorous evaluation. IoT
devices also often have a small and recognizable pattern of
communication (as demonstrated in our previous work [20]).
Hence, the MUD proposal allows IoT device behaviour to
be captured succinctly, verified formally for compliance with
organizational policy, and assessed at run-time for anomalous
behavior that could indicate an ongoing cyber-attack.
Fig. 1. A metagraph consisting of six variables, five sets and three edges.
A valid MUD profile contains a root object called “access-
lists” container [10] which comprise of several access con-
trol entries (ACEs), serialized in JSON format. Access-lists
are explicit in describing the direction of communication,
i.e., from-device and to-device. Each ACE matches traffic on
source/destination port numbers for TCP/UDP, and type and
code for ICMP. The MUD specifications also distinguish local-
networks traffic from Internet communications.
We provide here a brief background on the formal modeling
and verification framework used in this paper. We begin
by noting that the lack of formal policy modeling in cur-
rent network systems contribute to frequent misconfigurations
[21]–[23]. We use the concept of a metagraph, which is a
generalized graph-theoretic structure that offers rigorous for-
mal foundations for modeling and analyzing communication-
network policies in general. A metagraph is a directed graph
between a collection of sets of “atomic” elements [24]. Each
set is a node in the graph and each directed edge represents the
relationship between two sets. Fig. 1 shows an example where
a set of users (U1) are related to sets of network resources (R1,
R2, R3) by the edges e1, e2 and e3 describing which user ui
is allowed to access resource rj .
Metagraphs can also have attributes associated with their
edges. An example is a conditional metagraph which includes
propositions – statements that may be true or false – assigned
to their edges as qualitative attributes [24]. The generating sets
of these metagraphs are partitioned into a variable set and a
proposition set. A conditional metagraph is formally defined
as follows:
Definition 1 (Conditional Metagraph). A conditional meta-
graph is a metagraph S=〈Xp ∪Xv, E〉 in which Xp is a set
of propositions and Xv is a set of variables, and:
1. at least one vertex is not null, i.e., ∀e′ ∈ E, Ve′∪We′ 6= φ
2. the invertex and outvertex of each edge must be disjoint,
i.e., X = Xv ∪Xp with Xv ∩Xp = φ
3. an outvertex containing propositions cannot contain other
elements, i.e., ∀p ∈ Xp,∀e′ ∈ E, if p ∈We′ , then We′ = p.
Conditional metagraphs enable the specification of stateful
network-policies and have several useful operators. These
operators readily allow one to analyze MUD policy properties
like consistency.
The MUD proposal defines how a MUD profile needs to
be fetched. The MUD profile will be downloaded using a
MUD url (e.g., via DHCP option). For legacy devices already
in production networks, MUD specifications suggest to create
a mapping of those devices to their MUD url. Therefore, in
this paper, we develop a method (in §V) for automatic device
3TABLE I
FLOWS OBSERVED FOR BLIPCARE BP MONITOR (*: WILDCARD, PROTO:
PROTOCOL, SPORT: SOURCE PORT NUMBER, DPORT: DESTINATION PORT
NUMBER).
Source Destination proto sPort dPort
* 192.168.1.1 17 * 53
192.168.1.1 * 17 53 *
* tech.carematix.com 6 * 8777
tech.carematix.com * 6 8777 *
identification using MUD profiles to reduce the complexity of
manual mapping a device to its corresponding MUD-url.
Past works have employed machine learning to classify
IoT devices for asset management [25], [26]. Method in
[25] employs over 300 attributes (packet-level and flow-level),
though the most influential ones are minimum, median, and
average of packet volume, Time-To-Live (TTL), the ratio of
total bytes transmitted and received, and the total number
of packets with RST flag reset. Work in [26] proposes to
use features with less computation cost at runtime. Existing
Machine learning based proposals need to re-train their model
when a new device type is added – this limits the usability
in terms of not being able to transfer the models across
deployments.
While all the above works make important contributions,
they do not leverage the MUD proposal, which the IETF
is pushing for vendors to adopt. We overcome the short-
fall by developing an IoT device classification framework
which dynamically compares the device traffic traces (run-time
network behavior) with known static IoT MUD signatures.
Using this framework, we are able to identify (a) legacy IoT
devices without vendor MUD support; (b) IoT devices with
outdated firmware; and (c) IoT devices which are potentially
compromised.
III. MUD PROFILE GENERATION
The IETF MUD specification is still evolving as a draft.
Hence, IoT device manufacturers have not yet provided MUD
profiles for their devices. We, therefore, developed a tool –
MUDgee – which automatically generates a MUD profile for
an IoT device from its traffic trace in order to make this process
faster, cheaper and more accurate. In this section, we describe
the structure of our open source tool [12], apply it to traces
of 28 consumer IoT devices, and highlight insights.
We captured traffic flows for each IoT device during a six
month observation period, to generate our MUD rules. The
IETF MUD draft allows both ‘allow’ and ‘drop’ rules. In our
work, instead, we generate profiles that follow a whitelisting
model (i.e., only ‘allow’ rules with default ‘drop’). Having a
combination of ‘accept’ and ‘drop’ rules requires a notion of
rule priority (i.e., order) and is not supported by the current
IETF MUD draft. For example, Table I shows traffic flows
observed for a Blipcare blood pressure monitor. The device
only generates traffic whenever it is used. It first resolves its
intended server at tech.carematrix.com by exchanging a
DNS query/response with the default gateway (i.e., the top two
flows). It then uploads the measurement to its server operating
on TCP port 8777 (described by the bottom two rules).
install bidirectional flow rule with 
forward action
Yes
NoNoDNS 
reply
DNS cache: store 
domain-name and 
its IP addr.
Yes
Pkt.
remove flow rule ! corresponding to same 
domain-name if "#$ ! > &
Yes
NTP/ 
ICMP/ DNS 
request
IP exists 
in DNS cache
No
Label the Pkt as
unicast, multicast, or broadcast
Checks TCP SYN
Read PCAP
Loop till EOF
• identify direction (from/to device) 
• identify type (local/Internet)
Remove the flow 
rule ! if there is 
no record in 
DNS cache and 
the flow volume 
is less than a 
threshold '
Fig. 2. Algorithm for capturing device flows and inserting reactive rules.
A. MUDgee Architecture
MUDgee implements a programmable virtual switch
(vSwitch) with a header inspection engine attached and plays
an input PCAP trace (of an arbitrary IoT device) into the
switch. MUDgee has two separate modules; (a) captures and
tracks all TCP/UDP flows to/from device, and (b) composes
a MUD profile from the flow rules. We describe these two
modules in detail below.
Capture intended flows: Consumer IoT devices use services
provided by remote cloud servers and also expose services
to local hosts (e.g., a mobile App). We track (intended) both
remote and local device communications using separate flow
rules to meet the MUD specification requirements.
It is challenging to capture services (i.e., especially those
operating on non-standard TCP/UDP ports) that a device is
either accessing or exposing. This is because local/remote
services operate on static port numbers whereas source port
numbers are dynamic (and chosen randomly) for different
flows of the same service. We note that it is trivial to deduce
the service for TCP flows by inspecting the SYN flag, but not
so easy for UDP flows. We, therefore, developed an algorithm
(Fig. 2) to capture bidirectional flows for an IoT device.
We first configure the vSwitch with a set of proactive
rules, each with a specific action (i.e., “forward” or “mirror”)
and a priority (detailed rules can be found in our technical
report [11]). Proactive rules with a ‘mirror’ action will feed
the header inspection engine with a copy of the matched
packets. Our inspection algorithm, shown in Fig. 2, will insert
a corresponding reactive rule into the vSwitch.
Our algorithm matches a DNS reply to a top priority flow
and extracts and stores the domain name and its associated IP
address in a DNS cache. This cache is dynamically updated
upon arrival of a DNS reply matching an existing request.
The MUD specification also requires the segregation of
traffic to and from a device for both local and Internet com-
munications. Hence, our algorithm assigns a unique priority
to the reactive rules associated with each of the groups: from-
local, to-local, from-Internet and to-Internet. We use a specific
priority for flows that contain a TCP SYN to identify if the
device or the remote entity initiated the communication.
Flow translation to MUD: MUDgee uses the captured traffic
flows to generate a MUD profile for each device. We convert
each flow to a MUD ACE by considering the following:
Consideration 1: We reverse lookup the IP address of the
remote endpoint and identify the associated domain name (if
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(b) Amazon Echo (see Listing 1 for description of domain set1-3).
Fig. 3. Sankey diagrams of MUD profiles for: (a) TP-Link camera, and (b) Amazon Echo.
any), using the DNS cache.
Consideration 2: Some consumer IoTs, especially IP cam-
eras, typically use the Session Traversal Utilities for NAT
(STUN) protocol to verify that the user’s mobile app can
stream video directly from the camera over the Internet. If
a device uses the STUN protocol over UDP, we must allow
all UDP traffic to/from Internet servers because the STUN
servers often require the client device to connect to different
IP addresses or port numbers.
Consideration 3: We observed that several smart IP cameras
communicate with many remote servers operating on the same
port (e.g., Belkin Wemo switch). However, no DNS responses
were found corresponding to the server IP addresses. So, the
device must obtain the IP address of its servers via a non-
standard channel (e.g., the current server may instruct the
device with the IP address of the subsequent server). If a
device communicates with several remote IP addresses (i.e.,
more than our threshold value of five), all operating on the
same port, we allow remote traffic to/from any IP addresses
(i.e., *) on that specific port number.
Consideration 4: Some devices (e.g., TPLink plug) use the
default gateway as the DNS resolver, and others (e.g., Belkin
WeMo motion) continuously ping the default gateway. The
existing MUD draft maps local communication to fixed IP
addresses through the controller construct. We consider the
local gateway to act as the controller, and use the name-space
urn:ietf:params:mud:gateway for the gateway.
The generated MUD profiles of the 28 consumer IoT
devices in our test bed are listed in Table II and are publicly
available at: https://iotanalytics.unsw.edu.au/mud/.
B. Insights and challenges
The Blipcare BP monitor is an example device with static
functionalities. It exchanges DNS queries/responses with the
local gateway and communicates with a single domain name
over TCP port 8777. So its behavior can be locked down to a
limited set of static flow rules. The majority of IoT devices that
we tested (i.e., 22 out of 28) fall into this category (marked
in green in Table II).
We use Sankey diagrams (shown in Fig. 3) to represent the
MUD profiles in a human-friendly way. The second category
of our generated MUD profiles is exemplified by Fig. 3(a).
This Sankey diagram shows how the TP-Link camera access-
es/exposes limited ports on the local network. The camera gets
TABLE II
LIST OF IOT DEVICES FOR WHICH WE HAVE GENERATED MUD PROFILES.
DEVICES WITH PURELY STATIC FUNCTIONALITY ARE MARKED IN GREEN.
DEVICES WITH STATIC FUNCTIONALITY THAT IS LOOSELY DEFINED (e.g.,
DUE TO USE OF STUN PROTOCOL) ARE MARKED IN BLUE. DEVICES WITH
COMPLEX AND DYNAMIC FUNCTIONALITY ARE MARKED IN RED.
Type IoT device
Camera
Netatmo Welcome, Dropcam, Withings Smart
Baby Monitor, Canary camera, TP-Link Day
Night Cloud camera, August doorbell camera,
Samsung SmartCam, Ring doorbell, Belkin
NetCam
Air quality
sensors
Awair air quality monitor, Nest smoke sensor,
Netatmo weather station
Healthcare
devices
Withings Smart scale, Blipcare Blood
Pressure meter, Withings Aura smart sleep
sensor
Switches and
Triggers
iHome power plug, WeMo power switch,
TPLink plug, Wemo Motion Sensor
Lightbulbs Philips Hue lightbulb, LiFX bulb
Hub Amazon Echo, SmartThings
Multimedia Chromecast, Triby Speaker
Other HP printer, Pixstar Photoframe, Hello Barbie
its DNS queries resolved, discovers local network using mDNS
over UDP 5353, probes members of certain multicast groups
using IGMP, and exposes two TCP ports 80 (management
console) and 8080 (unicast video streaming) to local devices.
All these activities can be defined by a tight set of ACLs.
But, over the Internet, the camera communicates to its
STUN server, accessing an arbitrary range of IP addresses
and port numbers shown by the top flow. Due to this commu-
nication, the functionality of this device can only be loosely
defined. Devices that fall in to this category (i.e., due to the
use of STUN protocol), are marked in blue in Table II. The
functionality of these devices can be more tightly defined if
manufacturers of these devices configure their STUN servers
to operate on a specific set of endpoints and port numbers,
instead of a broad and arbitrary range.
Amazon Echo, represents devices with complex and dy-
namic functionality, augmentable using custom recipes or
skills. Such devices (marked in red in Table II), can com-
municate with a growing range of endpoints on the Internet,
which the original manufacturer cannot define in advance. For
example, our Amazon Echo interacts with the Hue lightbulb
in our test bed by communicating with meethue.com over
TCP 443. It also contacts the news website abc.net.au when
5Listing 1. Example list of domains accessed by Amazon Echo corresponding
to Figure 2(b).
domain_set1:
0.north−america.pool.ntp.org ,
1.north−america.pool.ntp.org ,
3.north−america.pool.ntp.org
domain_set2:
det−ta−g7g.amazon.com ,
dcape−na.amazon.com ,
softwareupdates.amazon.com ,
domain_set3:
kindle−time.amazon.com ,
spectrum.s3.amazonaws.com ,
d28julafmv4ekl.cloudfront.net ,
live−radio01.mediahubaustralia.com ,
amzdigitaldownloads.edgesuite.net ,
www.example.com
prompted by the user. For these type of devices, the biggest
challenge is how manufacturers can dynamically update their
MUD profiles to match the device capabilities. But, even the
initial MUD profile itself can help setup a minimum network-
communication permissions set that can be amended over time.
IV. MUD PROFILE VERIFICATION
Network operators should not allow a device to be installed
in their network, without first checking its compatibility with
the organisation’s security policy. We’ve developed a tool –
MUDdy – which can help with the task. MUDdy can check
an IoT device’s MUD profile is correct syntactically and
semantically and ensure that only devices which are compliant
and have MUD signatures that adhere to the IETF proposal
are deployed in a network.
A. Syntactic correctness
A MUD profile comprises of a YANG model that describes
device-specific network behavior. In the current version of
MUD, this model is serialized using JSON [10] and this
serialisation is limited to a few YANG modules (e.g., ietf-
access-control-list). MUDdy raises an invalid syntax exception
when parsing a MUD profile if it detects any schema beyond
these permitted YANG modules.
MUDdy also rejects MUD profiles containing IP addresses
with local significance. The IETF advises MUD-profile pub-
lishers to utilise the high-level abstractions provided in the
MUD proposal and avoid using hardcoded private IP addresses
[10]. MUDdy also discards MUD profiles containing access-
control actions other than ‘accept’ or ‘drop’.
B. Semantic correctness
Checking a MUD policy’s syntax partly verifies its correct-
ness. A policy must additionally be semantically correct; so
we must check a policy, for instance, for inconsistencies.
Policy inconsistencies can produce unintended conse-
quences [27] and in a MUD policy, inconsistencies can stem
from (a) overlapping rules with different access-control ac-
tions; and/or (b) overlapping rules with identical actions. The
MUD proposal excludes rule ordering, so, the former describes
ambiguous policy-author intent (i.e., intent-ambiguous rules).
In comparison, the latter associates a clear (single) outcome
Fig. 4. Metagraph model of a LiFX bulb’s MUD policy. The policy describes
permitted traffic flow behavior. Each edge label has attached a set of propo-
sitions of the metagraph. For example e4={protocol = 17, UDP.dport =
53, UDP.sport = 0− 65535, action = accept}.
and describes redundancies. Our adoption of an application-
whitelisting model prevents the former by design, but, redun-
dancies are still possible and need to be checked.
MUDdy models a MUD policy using a metagraph under-
neath. This representation enables us to use Metagraph alge-
bras [24] to precisely check the policy model’s consistency.
It’s worth noting here that past works [28] classify policy
consistency based on the level of policy-rule overlap. But,
these classifications are only meaningful when the policy-rule
order is important (e.g., in a vendor-device implementation).
However, rule order is not considered in the IETF MUD
proposal and it is also generally inapplicable in the context
of a policy metagraph. Below is a summary description of the
process we use to check the consistency of a policy model.
1) Policy modeling: Access-control policies are often rep-
resented using the five-tuple: source/destination address, pro-
tocol, source/destination ports [29]–[31]. We construct MUD
policy metagraph models leveraging this idea. Fig. 4 shows an
example for a Lifx bulb. Here, the source/destination addresses
are represented by the labels device, local-network,
local-gateway and a domain-name (e.g., pool.ntp.org).
Protocol and ports are propositions of the metagraph.
2) Policy definition and verification: We wrote MGtoolkit
[32] – a package for implementing metagraphs – to instantiate
our policy models. MGtoolkit is implemented in Python 2.7.
The API allows users to create metagraphs, apply metagraph
operations and evaluate results.
Mgtoolkit provides a ConditionalMetagraph class which
extends a Metagraph and supports propositions. The class in-
herits the members of a Metagraph and additionally supports
methods to check consistency. We use this class to instantiate
our MUD policy models and check their consistency.
Our verification of metagraph consistency uses dominance
[24] which can be introduced constructively as follows:
Definition 2 (Edge-dominant Metapath). Given a metagraph
S=〈X,E〉 for any two sets of elements B and C in X , a
metapath M(B,C) is said to be edge-dominant if no proper
subset of M(B,C) is also a metapath from B to C.
Definition 3 (Input-dominant Metapath). Given a metagraph
S=〈X,E〉 for any two sets of elements B and C in X , a
metapath M(B,C) is said to be input-dominant if there is no
metapath M ′(B′, C) such that B′ ⊂ B.
6In other words, edge-dominance (input-dominance) ensures
that none of the edges (elements) in the metapath are redun-
dant. These concepts allow us to define a dominant metapath
as per below. A non-dominant metapath indicates redundancy
in the policy represented by the metagraph.
Definition 4 (Dominant Metapath). Given a metagraph
S=〈X,E〉 for any two sets of elements B and C in X , a
metapath M(B,C) is said to be dominant if it is both edge
dominant and input-dominant.
3) Compatibility with best practices: MUD policy consis-
tency checks partly verify if it is semantically correct. In
addition, a MUD policy may need to be verified against a
local security policy or industry recommended practices (such
as the ANSI/ISA- 62443-1-1), for compliance. Doing so, is
critical when installing an IoT device in a mission-critical
network such as a SCADA network, where highly restrictive
cyber-security practices are required to safeguard people from
serious injury or even death!
We built an example organisational security policy based on
SCADA best practice guidelines to check MUD policy compli-
ance. We chose these best practices because they offer a wide
spectrum of policies representative of various organisations.
For instance, they include policies for the highly protected
SCADA zone (which, for instance, might run a power plant)
as well as the more moderately-restrictive Enterprise zone.
We define a MUD policy rule to be SCADA (or Enterprise)
zone compatible if its corresponding traffic flow complies with
SCADA (or Enterprise) best practice policy. For instance, a
MUD rule which permits a device to communicate with the
local network using DNS complies with the Enterprise zone
policy. But, a rule enabling device communication with an
Internet server using HTTP violates the SCADA zone policy.
Our past work has investigated the problem of policy
comparison using formal semantics, in the SCADA domain
for firewall access-control policies [33]. We adapt the methods
and algebras developed there, to also check MUD policies
against SCADA best practices. Key steps enabling these
formal comparisons are summarized below.
Policies are mapped into a unique canonical decomposition.
Policy canonicalisation can be represented through a mapping
c : Φ → Θ, where Φ is the policy space and Θ is the
canonical space of policies. All equivalent policies of Φ map
to a singleton. For pX , pY ∈ Φ, we note the following (the
proof follows the definition)
Lemma 5. Policies pX ≡ pY iff c(pX) = c(pY ).
MUD policy compliance can be checked by comparing
canonical policy components. For instance
Is c(pdevice→controller) = c(pSCADA→Enterprise) ?
A notation also useful in policy comparison is that policy
PA includes policy PB . In SCADA networks, the notation
helps evaluate whether a MUD policy is compliant with
industry-recommended practices in [34], [35]. A violation
increases the vulnerability of a SCADA zone to cyber attacks.
We indicate that a policy complies with another if it is more
restrictive or included in and define the following
Definition 6 (Inclusion). A policy pX is included in pY on A
iff pX(s) ∈ {pY (s), φ}, i.e., X either has the same effect as
Y on s, or denies s, for all s ∈ A. We denote inclusion by
pX ⊂ pY .
A MUD policy (MP ) can be checked against a SCADA
best practice policy (RP ) for compliance using inclusion
Is pMP ⊂ pRP ?
The approach can also be used to check if a MUD policy
complies with an organisation’s local security policy, to ensure
that IoT devices are plug and play enabled, only in the
compatible zones of the network.
C. Verification results
We ran MUDgee on a standard laptop computer (e.g., Intel
Core CPU 3.1 GHz computer with 16GB of RAM running
Mac OS X) and generated MUD profiles for 28 consumer
IoT devices installed in our test bed. MUDgee generated these
profiles by parsing a 2.75 Gb PCAP file (containing 4.5 months
of packet trace data from our test bed), within 8.5 minutes
averaged per device. Table III shows a high-level summary of
these MUD profiles.
It should be noted that a MUD profile generated from a
device’s traffic trace can be incorrect if the device is compro-
mised, as the trace might include malicious flows. In addition,
the generated MUD profile is limited to the input trace. Our
tool can be extended by an API that allows manufacturers to
add rules that are not captured in the PCAP trace.
Zigbee, Z-wave and bluetooth technologies are also increas-
ingly being used by IoT devices. Thus, such devices come
with a hub capable of communicating with the Internet. In
such cases, a MUD profile can be generated only for the hub.
We then ran MUDdy on a standard desktop computer (e.g.,
Intel Core CPU 2.7-GHz computer with 8GB of RAM running
Mac OS X) to automatically parse the generated MUD profiles
and identify inconsistencies within them. Our adoption of
an application whitelisting model restricts inconsistencies to
redundancies. We determined non-dominant metapaths (as per
Definition 4) in each policy metagraph built by MUDdy, to
detect redundancies. The average times (in milliseconds) taken
to find these redundancies are shown in Table III.
As the table shows, there were for instance, three redundant
rules present in the Belkin camera’s MUD policy. These rules
enabled ICMP traffic to the device from the local network as
well as the local controller, making the policy inefficient.
Table III also illustrates the results from our MUD policy
best-practice compliance checks. For instance, a Blipcare
blood pressure monitor can be safely installed in the De-
militarized zone (DMZ) or the Enterprise zone but not in
a SCADA zone: 50% of its MUD rules violate the best
practices, exposing the zone to potential cyber-attacks. Policy
rules enabling the device to communicate with the Internet
directly, trigger these violations.
In comparison, an Amazon echo speaker can only be safely
installed in a DMZ. Table III shows that 29% of the device’s
MUD rules violate the best practices if it’s installed in the
SCADA zone. Only 2% of the rules violate if it’s installed
in the Enterprise zone. The former violation stems from rules
7TABLE III
MUD POLICY ANALYSIS SUMMARY FOR OUR TEST BED IOT DEVICES USING Muddy ( Safe to install? INDICATES WHERE IN A NETWORK (e.g.,
ENTERPRISE ZONE, SCADA ZONE, DMZ) THE DEVICE CAN BE INSTALLED WITHOUT VIOLATING BEST PRACTICES, DMZ - DEMILITARIZED ZONE,
CORP ZONE - ENTEPRISE ZONE). Muddy RAN ON A STANDARD DESKTOP COMPUTER; e.g., INTEL CORE CPU 2.7-GHZ COMPUTER WITH 8GB OF RAM
RUNNING MAC OS X)
Device name #MUD
profile
rules
#Redundant
rules
Redundancy
checking
CPU time (s)
Compliance
checking
CPU time (s)
Safe to
install ?
% Rules
violating
SCADA Zone
% Rules
violating
Corp Zone
Blipcare bp 6 0 0.06 38 DMZ, Corp Zone 50 0
Netatmo weather 6 0 0.04 36 DMZ, Corp Zone 50 0
SmartThings hub 10 0 1 39 DMZ, Corp Zone 60 0
Hello barbie doll 12 0 0.6 38 DMZ, Corp Zone 33 0
Withings scale 15 4 0.5 40 DMZ, Corp Zone 33 0
Lifx bulb 15 0 0.8 42 DMZ, Corp Zone 60 0
Ring door bell 16 0 1 39 DMZ, Corp Zone 38 0
Awair air monitor 16 0 0.3 101 DMZ, Corp Zone 50 0
Withings baby 18 0 0.2 41 DMZ, Corp Zone 28 0
iHome power plug 17 0 0.1 42 DMZ 41 6
TPlink camera 22 0 0.4 40 DMZ 50 4
TPlink plug 25 0 0.6 173 DMZ 24 4
Canary camera 26 0 0.4 61 DMZ 27 4
Withings sensor 28 0 0.2 71 DMZ 29 4
Drop camera 28 0 0.3 214 DMZ 43 11
Nest smoke sensor 32 0 0.3 81 DMZ 25 3
Hue bulb 33 0 2 195 DMZ 27 3
Wemo motion 35 0 0.4 47 DMZ 54 8
Triby speaker 38 0 1.5 187 DMZ 29 3
Netatmo camera 40 1 0.9 36 DMZ 28 2
Belkin camera 46 3 0.9 55 DMZ 52 11
Pixstar photo frame 46 0 0.9 43 DMZ 48 28
August door camera 55 9 0.8 38 DMZ 42 13
Samsung camera 62 0 1.7 193 DMZ 39 19
Amazon echo 66 4 3.2 174 DMZ 29 2
HP printer 67 10 1.8 87 DMZ 25 9
Wemo switch 98 3 3.1 205 DMZ 24 6
Chrome cast 150 24 1.1 56 DMZ 11 2
which for instance, enable HTTP to the device. The latter is
due to rules enabling ICMP to the device from the Internet.
MUDdy’s ability to pinpoint to MUD rules which fail
compliance, helps us to identify possible workarounds to
overcome the failures. For instance, in the Belkin camera, local
DNS servers and Web servers can be employed to localize the
device’s DNS and Web communications to achieve compliance
in the SCADA zone.
D. MUD recommendations
At present, the MUD specification allows both accept and
drop rules but does not specify priority, allowing ambigu-
ity. This ambiguity is removed if only accept rules (i.e.,
whitelisting) is used. Whitelisting means metagraph edges
describe enabled traffic flows. So, the absence of an edge
implies two metagraph nodes don’t communicate with one
another. But when drop rules are introduced, an edge also
describes prohibited traffic flows, hindering easy visualization
and understanding of the policy. We recommend the MUD
proposal be revised to only support explicit ‘accept’ rules.
The MUD proposal also does not support private IP ad-
dresses, instead profiles are made readily transferrable between
networks via support for high-level abstractions. For instance,
to communicate with other IoT devices in the network, ab-
stractions such as same-manufacturer is provided.
The MUD proposal however, permits the use of public IP
addresses. This relaxation of the rule allows close coupling of
policy with network implementation, increasing its sensitivity
to network changes. A MUD policy describes IoT device be-
havior and should only change when its actual behavior alters
and not when network implementation changes! Hardcoded
public IP addresses can also lead to accidental DoS of target
hosts. A good example is the DoS of NTP servers at the
University of Wisconsin due to hardcoded IP addresses in
Netgear routers [36]. We recommend that support for explicit
public IP addresses be dropped from the MUD proposal.
V. CHECKING RUN-TIME PROFILE OF IOT DEVICES
In this section, we track the runtime network behavior of
IoT devices and map them to a known MUD profile. This
is needed to manage legacy IoTs which lack vendor support
for the MUD standard. To do so, we generate and update a
device’s runtime behavioral profile (in the form of a tree), and
check its “similarity” to known static MUD profiles provided
by manufacturers. We note that computing similarity between
two profiles is a non-trivial task.
Profile structure: A device’s run-time profile has two key
components namely “Internet” and “Local” communication
channels as shown by purple and green regions in Fig. 5.
Each profile is organized into a tree-like structure containing
a set of nodes with categorical attributes (i.e., end-point,
protocol, port number over Internet/Local channels) connected
through edges. Following the root node in this tree, we have
nodes representing the channel/direction of communication,
endpoints with which the device communicates, and the flow
characteristics (i.e., the leaf node). We generate a device’s run-
time profile as described in §III with slight variations.
MUDgee requires to track the traffic volumes exchanged in
each direction for UDP flows to distinguish the UDP server
and the client. This can lead to a high consumption of memory
when generating run-time profiles. Hence, given a UDP flow,
we search all known MUD profiles for an overlapping region.
If an overlapping region is found, the tree structure is updated
with intersecting port ranges – this can be seen in Fig. 5 where
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(a) 30-minutes of traffic capture.
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(b) 480-minutes of traffic capture.
Fig. 5. Run-time profile of a TPLink power plug generated at two snapshots in time: (i) after 30 minutes of traffic capture; and (ii) after 8 hours of traffic
capture. As observable the profile grows over time by accumulating nodes and edges.
R Mi
Fig. 6. Comparison of a device’s run-time profile R against a known MUD
profile Mi.
the leaf node, shown in light-blue text, has been changed
according to known MUD profiles. If no overlap is found,
we split the UDP flow into two leaf nodes – one matches the
UDP source port (with a wild-carded destination) and the other
matches the UDP destination port (with a wild-carded source).
This helps us to identify the server side by subsequent packet
matching on either of these flows.
Metrics: We denote each run-time profile and MUD profile
by the sets R and Mi respectively, as shown in Fig. 6. An
element of each set is represented by a branch of the tree
structure shown in Fig. 5. For a given IoT device, we need to
check the similarity of its R with a number of known Mi’s.
There are a number of metrics for measuring the similarity
of two sets. Jaccard index is widely used for comparing two
sets of categorical values, and defined by the ratio of the
size of the intersection of two sets to the size of their union,
i.e., |R ∩ Mi|/|R ∪ Mi|. Inspired by the Jaccard index, we
define the following two metrics:
• Dynamic similarity score: simd(R,Mi) = |R ∩ Mi||R|
• Static similarity score: sims(R,Mi) = |R ∩ Mi||Mi|
These two metrics collectively represent the Jaccard index.
Each metric can take a value between 0 (i.e., disjoint) and 1
(i.e., identical). Similarity scores are computed per epoch (e.g.,
15 minutes). When computing |R ∩ Mi|, we temporarily
morph the run-time profile based on each MUD profile it
is checked against. This assures that duplicate elements are
pruned from R when checking against each Mi.
We note that the run-time profile grows over time by
accumulating nodes (and edges), as shown by the example in
Fig. 5. As per the figure, 30 minutes into profile generation,
the run-time profile of the TP-Link power plug consists of
eight elements (i.e., edges). This element count reaches 15
when additional device traffic is processed (Fig. 5(b)).
At the end of each epoch, a device (or a group of devices)
with the maximum similarity score will be chosen as the
“winner”. We expect to find a group of devices as the winner
when considering dynamic similarity, because only a small
subset of the device’s behavioral profile is observed initially.
The number of winners will reduce as the device’s run-time
profile grows over time.
Fig. 7 shows the time trace of similarity scores for the win-
ners Awair air quality, LiFX bulb, WeMo switch, and Amazon
Echo. In each plot, a single correct winner is identified per
device. As Fig. 7(a) shows, the static similarity score grows
slowly over time in a non-decreasing fashion. The convergence
time depends on the complexity of the device’s behavioral
profile. For example, the static similarity score of Awair air
quality and LiFX bulb converges to 1 within 1000 minutes.
But for the Amazon Echo, it takes more time to gradually
discover all flows – the convergence time is about 12 days.
There are also devices for which the static similarity may
not converge to 1. For example, WeMo switch and WeMo
motion use a list of hard-coded IP addresses (instead of domain
names) for their NTP communications. These IP addresses are
now obsolete; no NTP reply flows are captured. Likewise, the
TPLink plug uses the domain “s1b.time.edu.cn” for NTP
communication and this domain is also no longer operational.
Devices such as the August doorbell and Dropcam also contact
public DNS resolvers (e.g., 8.8.4.4) if the local gateway fails
to respond to a DNS query from the IoT device. This specific
flow can only be captured if there is an Internet outage.
On the other hand, the dynamic similarity score grows
quickly as shown in Fig. 7(b). It may even reach 1 (i.e.,
R ⊂Mi) and stay at 1, if no deviation is observed – deviation
is the complement of the dynamic similarity measured in the
range of [0, 1] and computed as 1− simd . Awair air quality
monitor exhibits such behavior as shown by the dashed black
lines in Fig. 7(b) – 19 out of 28 IoT devices in our testbed
exhibit similar behavior in their dynamic similarity scores. In
90 2000 4000 6000
Time (min)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
St
at
ic 
sim
ila
rit
y 
sc
or
e
Awair air quality
LiFX bulb
Wemo switch
Amazon Echo
(a) Static similarity score.
0 2000 4000 6000
Time (min)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Dy
na
m
ic 
sim
ila
rit
y 
sc
or
e
Awair air quality
LiFX bulb
Wemo switch
Amazon Echo
(b) Dynamic similarity score.
0 2000 4000 6000
Time (min)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Dy
na
m
ic 
sim
ila
rit
y 
sc
or
e
Awair air quality
LiFX bulb
Wemo switch
Amazon Echo
(c) Dynamic similarity score (SSDP excluded).
Fig. 7. Time-trace of dynamic and static similarity scores for the winners of four IoT devices. Convergence time depends on the behaviour complexity of the
device; for example, the static similarity score of the LiFX bulb converges to 1 within 1000 minutes whereas it takes about 12 days for the more complex
Amazon echo to converge.
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Fig. 8. SSDP runtime profile describing all discovery communications across
all devices in the network.
other cases, these scores may fluctuate; a fluctuating dynamic
similarity never meets 1 due to missing elements (i.e., devi-
ation). Missing elements can arise due to (a) a MUD profile
being unknown or not well-defined by the manufacturer, (b) a
device firmware being outdated, and (c) an IoT device being
compromised or under cyber attack.
We found that nine of our testbed IoTs had slight deviation.
These were due to two reasons, Firstly, when responding to
discovery requests in Local communications; if the devices
support the SSDP protocol 2, these responses cannot be tightly
specified by the manufacturer in the MUD profile as such
flows depend on the environment in which the IoT device
is deployed. An example is the WeMo switch, shown by
dashed-dotted red lines in Fig. 7(b). We populate all discovery
communications in a separate profile (shown in Fig. 8) by
inspecting SSDP packets exchanged over the local network to
address this issue. We note that the SSDP server port number
on the device can change dynamically, thus the inspection of
the first packet in a new SSDP flow is required. The second
reason for deviation is missing DNS packets which can lead
to emergence of a branch in the profile with an IP address as
the end-point instead of a domain name. This can occur in our
testbed because each midnight we start storing traffic traces
2Devices that supports Simple Service discovery protocol advertises or
notify device capabilities to Multicast UDP port 1900. Typically the payload
contains device information including IP address, name, UUID, management
URL, functionalities.
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Fig. 9. Time trace of winners count and static similarity score averaged
across 27 testbed IoT devices. The former shows six winners on average at
the beginning of the identification process. This count drops to a single winner
in less than three hours. Even with a single winner, the static similarity needs
about ten hours on average to exceed a threshold of 0.8.
into a new PCAP file, thus few packets may get lost during
this transition. Missing DNS packets were observed for the
LiFX bulb, as shown by dotted cyan lines in Fig. 7(b).
Thus, we exclude SSDP activity from local communications
of IoT devices to obtain a clear run-time profile. As Fig. 7(c)
shows, the filtering allows us to correctly identify the winner
for the WeMo switch within a very short time using the
dynamic similarity score.
Lastly, it is important to note that similarity scores (both
static and dynamic) can be computed at an aggregate level
(i.e., Local and Internet combined), or per individual channel.
The latter may not converge in some cases where the Local
channel similarity finds one winner while the Internet channel
similarity finds a different winner. We note that per-channel
similarity never results in a wrong winner, but may result
in finding no winners. In contrast, aggregate similarity can
lead to the wrong winner, especially when Local activity
becomes dominant in the behavioral profile. This is because
many IoTs have a significant profile overlap in their Local
communications (e.g., DHCP, ARP, or SSDP). Hence, we
begin by checking per-channel similarity, if the two channels
disagree, we switch to aggregate similarity to identify the
winner. We discuss this scenario in detail in §V-B.
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Predicted label
Amazon Echo
August doorbell
Awair air-quality
Belkin camera
Blipcare BP-meter
Canary camera
Chromecast ultra
Dropcam
Hello barbie
HP printer
Hue bulb
iHhome powerplug
LiFX bulb
Nest smoke-sensor
Netatmo camera
Netatmo weather
Pixstar photoframe
Ring doorbell
Samsung smartcam
SmartThings
TP-link camera
TP-link plug
Triby speaker
Wemo motion
Wemo switch
Withings cardio
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Fig. 10. Confusion matrix of true vs predicted device labels. The cell values are in percentages. As the table shows, for instance, the Amazon Echo (first
row) is always predicted as the sole winner in all epochs. Hence, a value of 100% is recorded in the first column and 0% in the remaining columns.
A. Identifying IoT Devices at Run-Time
Dataset: We use packet traces (i.e., PCAP files) collected
from our testbed comprising a gateway (i.e., a TP-Link Archer
C7 flashed with the OpenWrt firmware) that serves a number
of IoT devices. We store all network traffic (Local and Internet)
onto a 1TB USB storage connected to this gateway using
tcpdump. Our traffic traces span three months, starting from
May 2018, containing traffic corresponding to devices listed in
Table II (excluding Withings baby monitor). We used MUDgee
to generate the MUD profiles for these devices. We also
developed an application over our native SDN simulator [37]
to implement our identification process.
Identification Process: As described earlier, a dynamic
similarity score converges faster than a static similarity score.
So, our device identification process begins by tracking dy-
namic similarity at a channel level and continues as long
as channel agreement persists. Depending on the diversity of
observed traffic to/from the IoT device (Local vs Internet),
there may be multiple winners at the beginning of this process.
At this point, static similarity is fairly low, since only a
small fraction of the expected profile is likely captured in the
short period. Hence, our process needs additional traffic as
input for the device before it can conclude winners. Fig. 9
shows the time-trace evolution of winners count with static
similarity, averaged across our 27 testbed IoT devices. The
solid blue line (left y-axis), shows up to six winners on average
at the beginning of the identification process. This count
gradually drops (in less than three hours) to a single winner
and stabilizes. Even with a single winner, the static similarity,
shown by dashed black lines (right y-axis), needs about ten
hours on average to pass a threshold score of 0.8. Reaching
a static similarity score of 1 can take long (a full score may
also not be reached). So, the network operator must choose an
appropriate threshold to conclude traffic processing – a higher
threshold increases the device identification confidence level,
but comes at a cost of longer convergence time.
We replayed our packet traces collected in 2018 (i.e., Data-
2018) into our packet simulator tool. Fig. 10 shows a confusion
matrix of the results – rows are actual device labels, columns
are predicted device labels, and cell values are in percentage.
The table depicts the efficacy of our approach; for example,
the first row in the table shows that the Amazon Echo is always
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Fig. 11. Plot of dynamic similarity vs static similarity depicting 4 distinct states. In state-1, both dynamic and static similarity scores are high and we obtain
a single correct winner. In state-2, dynamic similarity is high but static similarity is low (usually occurs when only a small amount of traffic is observed).
State-3 describes a region with high static similarity yet low dynamic similarity, indicating high-deviation at run time (e.g., due to old firmware or device
being compromised). In state-4 both dynamic and static similarity scores are low indicating a significant difference between the run-time and MUD profiles.
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Fig. 13. Scatter plots of channel-level scores for dynamic and static similarity metrics across 27 testbed IoT devices. Each plot depicts two sets of results:
one for known MUD (blue markers) and the other for unknown MUD (red markers). Enforcing two thresholds (i.e., about 0.60 on the Internet channel and
0.75 on the Local channel) would filter incorrect matches found using dynamic similarity. A threshold of 0.50 on the Internet channel is sufficient to avoid
false identification when using static similarity.
predicted as the sole winner in each epoch. Hence, a value
100% is recorded in the first column and 0% in the remaining
columns. No other device is identified as the winner in any
epoch. Considering the row containing Dropcam, the device is
identified as another in some epochs. Hence, non-zero values
are recorded against all columns. But, Dropcam is always one
of the winners, i.e., its column records a value of 100%.
We observe correct convergence for all devices except for
the Netatmo camera where it is not correctly identified in
2.3% of epochs. This mis-identification occurs due to missing
DNS packets where some flows are incorrectly matched on
STUN related flows (with wild-carded endpoints) of Samsung
camera and TP-Link camera. This mis-identification occurs
only during the first few epochs, the process subsequently
converges to the correct winner. In what follows, we discuss
changes in IoT traffic behaviour in the network.
B. Monitoring Behavioral Change of IoTs
In practice, identifying an IoT device at runtime gives
rise to several challenges: (a) the network device may not
have a known MUD profile, (b) the device firmware may
be outdated (thus, the run-time profile can deviate from its
current MUD profile), and (c) the device may be under attack
or compromised. We focus on these issues here and discuss
our methodology to addressing these challenges.
Fig. 11 depicts a simplified scatter plot of dynamic similar-
ity versus static similarity, In this plot, there are color-coded
states labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4. Our ideal region is the green
quadrant (i.e., state-1) where both dynamic and static scores
are high, and we have a single correctly identified winner.
State-2 describes a region with a high dynamic similarity
score and a fairly low static similarity score. We expect this
state when only a small amount of traffic from the device
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is observed and additional traffic is needed to evaluate if
dynamic similarity will continue to remain high and static
similarity starts rising. State-3 describes a region with high
static similarity yet low dynamic similarity – this is indicative
of high deviation at run-time. We observe this state when many
flows identified in actual device traffic are not listed in the
intended MUD profile. This can be due to two reasons: (a)
the device firmware not being current, or (b) the device being
under attack or compromised. Finally, having low dynamic
and static similarity scores highlight a significant difference
between the run-time and MUD profiles. This scenario likely
results in an incorrectly identified winner.
In summary, IoT network operators may need to set thresh-
old values for both dynamic and static similarity scores to
select a winner device. The identification process must also
begin with channel-level similarity (for both dynamic and
static scores) and switch to aggregate-level in case of non-
convergence. In what follows, we quantity the impact of three
scenarios enabling IoT behavioral changes:
MUD profile unknown: We begin by removing a single MUD
profile at a time from a list of known MUD signatures.
Fig. 12 shows the partial results for each selected device.
Unsurprisingly, each row device is identified as another (i.e.,
wrong winner selected) since its intended MUD profile is
absent. For example, Amazon Echo converges to TP-Link
camera and Awair air quality monitor is consistently identified
as six other IoTs. Ideally, we should have no device identified
as a winner. It is important to note here, that these results were
derived without applying thresholds to the similarity scores -
i.e., only the maximum score was used to pick winners.
Fig. 13 shows scatter plots of channel-level scores for both
dynamic and static similarity metrics across our testbed IoT
devices. In each plot we depict two sets of results generated
using our Dataset-2018: one for known MUD (shown by blue
cross markers) and the other for unknown MUD (shown by
red circle markers). Enforcing two thresholds (i.e., about 0.60
on the Internet channel and 0.75 on the Local channel) would
filter incorrect matches found using dynamic similarity (i.e.,
Fig. 13(a)). A threshold of 0.50 on the Internet channel is
sufficient to avoid incorrect identification when using static
similarity (Fig. 13(b)). A single threshold is sufficient for the
latter because device behaviour on the Internet channel varies
significantly for the consumer devices we have running in our
testbed, but enterprise IoTs may tend to be more active on the
Local network, requiring a different thresholding mechanism.
We note here that a high threshold value increases the
time to identification and a low threshold value reduces it,
but can also lead to an incorrect winner. Hence, it is up to
the network operator to set threshold values. A conservative
approach may accept no deviation in dynamic similarity with a
static similarity score over 0.50 per Local and Internet channel.
We regenerated the results using these conservative thresh-
olds and found there were no winners due to low scores in
both dynamic and static-similarity metrics. This indicates that
devices, in the absence of their MUD profiles, are consistently
found in state-4 in Fig. 11, flagging possible issues.
Old firmware: IoT devices usually upgrade their firmware
automatically by directly communicating with a cloud server,
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Fig. 14. Tree structure depicting profile difference (i.e., R - M ) for the iHome
power plug.
or require the user to confirm the upgrade (e.g., WeMo switch)
via an App. In the latter case, devices can stay behind the
latest firmware until the user manually updates them. To
illustrate the impact of old firmware, we used packet traces
collected from our testbed for a duration of six months
starting in October 2016. We replayed Data-2016 to check
run-time profiles against the MUD profiles generated from
Data-2018. Table IV shows the results. The column labeled
“Profile changed” indicates whether any changes on device’s
behavior is observed from Data-2016 compared with Data-
2018. These behavioral changes include endpoints and/or port
numbers. For example, TP-Link camera communicates with a
server endpoint “devs.tplinkcloud.com” on TCP 50443 as
per Data-2016. However, this camera communicates with the
same endpoint on TCP 443 as per Data-2018. Additionally, as
per this dataset, an endpoint “ipcserv.tplinkcloud.com”
is observed which did not exist in Data-2016.
The column “Convergence” in Table IV describes the per-
formance of our device identification method for two scenarios
– known MUD and unknown MUD. When the MUD profile
of a device is known, we see that all devices except theWeMo
switch converge to the correct winner. Surprisingly, WeMo
switch is consistently identified as WeMo motion – even
when its static similarity reaches 0.96! This is because both
WeMo motion and WeMo switch share cloud-based endpoints
for their Internet communications in Data-2016, but these
endpoints have changed for the WeMo switch (but not for
WeMo motion) in Data-2018. It is important to note here that
our primary objective is to secure IoT devices by enforcing
tight access-control rules in policy arbiters. Therefore, the
WeMo switch can still be protected using WeMo motion MUD
rules until it gets the latest firmware update. Once updated, an
intrusion detection system [38] may generate false alarms for
the WeMo switch, indicating the need for a re-identification.
As described earlier, we need to enforce thresholds in the
identification process to discover unknown devices and resolve
problematic states. We applied the thresholds determined using
Data-2018 and the results are shown in Table IV under
“Convergence with threshold”. Devices without any behavioral
13
TABLE IV
IDENTIFICATION RESULTS FOR DATA 2016.
IoT device
Pr
ofi
le
ch
an
ge Convergence Convergence with threshold Endpoint compacted
Known MUD Unknown
MUD
Known MUD Unknown
MUD
Known MUD Unknown
MUD
Correctly
identified
(%)
Incorrectly
identified
(%)
Incorrectly
identified
(%)
Correctly
identified
(%)
Incorrectly
identified
(%)
State Incorrectly
identified
(%)
Correctly
identified
(%)
Incorrectly
identified
(%)
Incorrectly
identified
(%)
Amazon Echo Yes 100 0 100 65.7 0 3 0 65.7 0 0
August doorbell Yes 100 0 100 0 0 4 0 100 0 0
Awair air quality Yes 100 0 100 100 0 1 0 100 0 0
Belkin camera Yes 100 0 100 100 0 1 0 100 0 0
Blipcare BP meter No 100 0 100 100 0 1 0 100 0 0
Canary camera No 100 0 100 100 0 1 0 100 0 0
Dropcam Yes 100 0 100 95.9 0 3 0 100 0 0
Hello barbie No 100 0 100 100 0 1 0 100 0 0
HP printer Yes 100 0 100 3.6 0 4 0 99.8 0 0
Hue bulb Yes 100 0 100 0 0 4 0 90.6 0 0
iHome power plug Yes 100 0 100 0.5 0 4 0 100 0 0
LiFX bulb No 100 0 100 100 0 1 5.3 100 0 5.3
Nest smoke sensor Yes 100 0 100 0 0 4 0 100 0 0
Netatmo camera Yes 99.4 0.6 100 97.3 0 3 0 99 0 0
Netatmo weather No 100 0 100 100 0 1 0 100 0 0
Pixstar photoframe No 100 0 100 100 0 1 0 100 0 0
Ring doorbell Yes 100 0 100 99.6 0 3 0 97.9 0 0
Samsung smartcam Yes 100 0 100 97.6 0 1 0 97.6 0 0
Smart Things No 100 0 100 100 0 1 0 100 0 0
TPlink camera Yes 100 0 100 100 0 3 0 100 0 0.9
TPlink plug Yes 100 0 100 100 0 1 0 100 0 0
Triby speaker Yes 100 0 100 39.9 0 3 0 99.8 0 0
WeMo motion No 100 0 100 100 0 1 0.7 100 0 27.3
WeMo switch Yes 0 100 100 0 100 1 100 0 100 100
changes (from 2016 to 2018), converge correctly and are in
state-1. In other devices such as the Amazon Echo, only 65.7%
of instances are correctly identified – the identification process
takes considerable time to reach the threshold values.
We observe that devices with profile changes are found in
state-3 or state-4. These profile differences can be visualised
using a tree structure to better understand the causes of a
low dynamic similarity score. Fig. 14 for instance, shows
this difference (i.e., R − M ) for the iHome power plug.
As per Data-2016, this device communicates over HTTP
with “api.evrything.com” and serves HTTP to the Local
network. But, these communications do not exist in the MUD
profile generated from Data-2018. Thus, a firmware upgrade is
needed for the device or its current MUD profile is incomplete.
We may find a device (e.g., HP printer or Hue bulb)
consistently in state-4 throughout the identification process.
Structural deviation in the profile largely arise due to changes
in the endpoints or port numbers. Tracking port number
changes is non-trivial. However, for endpoints we can compact
fully-qualified domain names to primary domain names (i.e.,
by removing sub-domain names) – we call this technique as
endpoint compaction. Note that if the device is under attack
or compromised it is likely to communicate with a completely
new primary domain. Fig. 15 illustrates endpoint compaction
for the HP printer profile in the “to Internet” channel direction.
For this channel, without endpoint compaction, the static
and dynamic similarity scores are 0.28 and 0.25 respectively.
Applying endpoint compaction yields much higher similarity
scores of 1 and 0.83, respectively.
We applied endpoint compaction to all devices in Data-
2016 and the results are shown under “Endpoint compacted”
in Table IV. Interestingly, this technique significantly enhances
device identification; all state-4 devices transition to state-1.
We observe that even with endpoint compaction, when MUD is
unknown, the WeMo motion is incorrectly identified (as WeMo
switch) at a high rate of 27.3%. This is expected; devices from
the same manufacturer can get identified as one another when
the endpoints are compacted.
In summary, if the identification process does not converge
(or evolves very slowly) then our difference visualization and
endpoint compaction allows a network operator to discover
IoT devices running old firmware.
Attacked or compromised device: We now evaluate the ef-
ficacy of our solution when IoT devices are under direct/re-
flection attacks or compromised by a botnet. We use traffic
traces collected from our testbed in November 2017 (i.e., Data-
2017), comprising a number of volumetric attacks spanning
reflection-and-amplification (e.g., SNMP, SSDP, TCP SYN,
Smurf), flooding (e.g., TCP SYN, Fraggle, Ping of death),
ARP spoofing, and port scanning. The attacks were launched
on four testbed IoT devices – Belkin Netcam, WeMo motion,
Samsung smart-cam and WeMo switch (listed in Table V).
We initiated these attacks from the local network and from
the Internet. For Internet-sourced attacks, port forwarding was
enabled on the gateway (emulating malware behavior).
We built a custom device type – “Senseme” [39] – using an
Arduino Yun board communicating to the open-source WSO2
IoT cloud platform. We built this device because our testbed
IoT devices are all invulnerable to botnets. This device has a
temperature sensor and a bulb and it periodically publishes the
local temperature to its server and its bulb can be remotely
controlled via the MQTT protocol [40]. We generated the
MUD profile of this device and then infected it with the Mirai
botnet [41]. We disabled the injection module of the Mirai
code and only used its scanning module to avoid harming
others on the Internet. A Mirai infected device scans random
IP addresses on the Internet to find open telnet ports.
We applied our threshold-based identification method to
Data-2017 and found that all devices were identified correctly
with a high static similarity and low dynamic similarity (i.e.,
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Fig. 15. Endpoint compaction of the HP printer run-time and MUD profiles in the “to Internet” channel direction yields high static and dynamic similarity
(shown by the overlapping region in brown). Without compaction these similarities are significantly low (shown by the overlapping region in blue).
TABLE V
LIST OF ATTACKS LAUNCHED AGAINST OUR IOT DEVICES
(L: local, D: device, I: Internet).
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Fig. 16. Partial confusion matrix for 5 devices only (testing with attack data
2017).
high deviation). A partial confusion matrix for this is shown in
Fig. 16. The run-time profile of the Senseme quickly converges
to the winner (with a high static similarity score) because the
device’s MUD profile is fairly simple in terms of the branch
count. Other devices take longer to converge.
Various attacks have different impacts on the run-time
profile of IoT devices. ARP spoofing and TCP SYN based
attacks do not create new branches in a device profile’s tree
structure, hence, no deviation is captured. Fraggle, ICMP,
Smurf, SSDP, and SNMP attacks result in only two additional
flows, so a small deviation is captured. Port scans (botnet
included) initiate a large deviation and cause an increasing
number of endpoints to emerge in the tree structure at run-
time. For example, the Mirai botnet scans 30 IP addresses per
second, lowering the dynamic similarity to zero. Fig. 17 shows
the profile difference for the infected Senseme device at run-
time. Lastly, we show in Fig. 18 the evolution of similarity
scores for Belkin camera under attack. It is seen that the
static similarity slowly grows till it coverages to the correct
winner – according to Fig. 16 the first row, 2.2% of instances
(only during the beginning of the process) did not converge
to any winner. Instead, the dynamic similarity falls in time
approaching to zero.
C. Performance of Monitoring Profiles
We now quantify the performance of our scheme for real-
time monitoring of IoT behavioral profiles. We use four
metrics namely convergence time, memory usage, inspected
packets, and number of flows.
Convergence time: Convergence time highly depends on
type of the device and the similarity score thresholds. We
note that the device network activity (i.e., user interactions
with the device) is an important factor for the convergence,
since some IoTs (e.g., Blipcare BP meter) do not communicate
unless user interacts with the device. On the other hand,
devices such as Awair air quality and WeMo motion sensor do
not require any user interactions, and also cameras display a
variety of communication patterns including device-to-device
and device-to-Internet.
Table VI shows the convergence time (in minutes) for
individual devices in our testbed, across the three datasets.
For the Data-2018, all devices converge to their correct winner
within a day – the longest time taken to converge is 6 hours.
This is primarily because that for this dataset we developed
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Fig. 17. Profile difference for the Mirai infected device.
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Fig. 18. Evolution of similarity scores for Belkin camera under attack.
a script (using a touch replay tool running on a Samsung
galaxy tablet connected to the same testbed) that automatically
emulated the user interactions (via mobile app) with each
of these IoT devices (e.g., turning on/off the lightbulb, or
checking the live view of the camera). Our script repeated
every 6 hours.
Looking into Data-2017 column, it took up to 2 days to
converge for WeMo switch as an example – we only studied
five devices under attack. The red cells under Data-2016 corre-
spond to devices that converged due to endpoint compaction,
similar to Fig. 15. Note that without compaction technique
none of these devices (except Netatmo camera) converge to a
winner – Netatmo device required 4410 minutes to converge
without compaction. Similarly, it took a considerable amount
of time for Smart Things, Hue bulb, and Amazon echo to
converge – when analyzed the data, we found that these three
devices had no network activity (except a few flows during a
short interval at the beginning of the data capture) till close
to the convergence time when they became reasonably active
on the network.
In real production networks, the operator may choose to
begin with an upper bound threshold of convergence time for
each device. If it does not converge within stipulated time, the
phase of endpoint compaction can trigger with a corresponding
time threshold which is a hard limit for the monitoring process.
If the device identification is not concluded before the expected
time, the operator may decide to quarantine it for further
inspection.
TABLE VI
CONVERGENCE TIME (MINUTES) FOR ALL DATASETS.
Device Data-2018 Data-2017 Data-2016
Amazon Echo 15 - 38355
August doorbell 60 - 45
Awair air quality 30 - 15
Belkin camera 15 1065 105
Blipcare BPmeter 15 - 15
Canary camera 15 - 15
Chromecast 15 - -
Dropcam 360 - 15
Hello barbie 15 - 15
HP printer 105 - 15
Hue bulb 15 - 9315
iHome powerplug 15 - 165
LiFX bulb 15 - 15
Nest smoke 15 - 15
Netatmo camera 360 - 1650
Netatmo weather 15 - 15
Pixstar photoframe 15 - 15
Ring doorbell 30 - 45
Samsung smartcam 15 525 15
Smart Things 360 - 13785
TPlink camera 30 - 15
TPlink plug 30 - 15
Triby speaker 15 - 330
WeMo motion 15 360 15
WeMo switch 15 2820 15
Withings cardio 15 - -
Withings sleep 15 - -
Senseme - 15 15
TABLE VII
PERFORMANCE METRIC CALCULATED FOR DATA-2018.
Device # flows(per min)
# packets
(per min)
# nodes
(per min)
computing
time (ms)
Amazon Echo 13.72 6.58 68.83 1.38
August doorbell 20.11 13.44 65.84 1.71
Awair air quality 7.14 0.25 14.98 0.38
Belkin camera 16.26 5.79 65.3 0.95
Blipcare BPmeter 9.00 9.00 7.00 0.01
Canary camera 13.51 3.27 25.51 0.65
Chromecast 13.05 10.10 346.65 5.20
Dropcam 7.02 0.04 17.87 0.45
Hello barbie 5.86 3.72 9.52 0.72
HP printer 5.05 2.12 38.63 0.74
Hue Bulb 9.75 2.43 40.30 0.89
ihome powerplug 6.87 0.79 16.99 0.49
lifx bulb 8.65 1.60 18.86 0.50
Nest smoke 5.30 27.00 65.70 1.55
Netatmo camera 8.35 0.98 67.96 1.20
Netatmo weather 5.04 11.13 9.00 0.26
Pixstar photoframe 5.05 2.62 16.88 0.34
Ring doorbell 5.02 2.39 25.94 0.43
Samsung smartcam 10.37 1.34 209.98 2.00
Smart Things 7.50 3.20 13.96 0.27
TPlink camera 5.74 2.67 122.27 1.44
TPlink plug 5.07 3.96 26.49 0.51
Triby speaker 5.39 4.19 41.80 0.75
WeMo motion 14.76 10.66 213.59 2.97
WeMo switch 6.54 4.46 225.99 5.20
Withings cardio 5.57 11.00 9.00 0.15
Withings sleep 21.00 27.00 22.00 0.01
System performance: For the performance of our system,
we compute the following four metrics: average number of
inspected packets, average number of flows, average number
of nodes (in the device profile tree), and the computation time
(for tree compaction, removing redundancy, and computing
similarity scores) in our software tool. The average number
of flows is an important metric for the operation of hardware
switch with limited TCAM capacity, and other three metrics
relate to the scalability of our software for run-time profile
monitoring. Our results are shown in Table VII.
Starting from the first column, the average number of flows
for each device is typically less than 10, with the largest flow
16
count of about 20 for August doorbell. We note that this range
of flow counts is easily manageable in an enterprise network
setting with switches that are capable of handling millions of
flow entries. In home networks, instead, where routers that can
accommodate up to hundreds of flows, we may need to limit
our monitoring process to a few devices (at a time), managing
the TCAM constraint.
Moving to the number of packets inspected, it is clearly
seen that our approach is very effective by keeping the number
of inspected packets at a minimum (i.e., mostly less than 10
packets per minute for each device). The computing time of
our scheme solely depends on the number of nodes and the
number of known MUD profiles. The time complexity of our
method can be expressed as O(n.m. log n) where n is the
number of branches in the profile tree and m is the number
MUD profiles we are checking against. We have reduced the
time complexity for the search space by employing hashing
and binary search tree techniques. For Chromescast as an
example, the average computing time is 5.20 ms, where we
have on average 346 nodes in its run-time profile. This can be
further improved with use of parallelization whereby similarity
scores are computed over individual branches. It is important
to note that the computing time is upper-bounded since we set
an upper bound limit on the count of tree branches generated
at run-time.
Lastly, in terms of space, we need 40 Bytes of memory
for each node of a tree. This means that for Chromecast, on
average, less than 14 KB of memory is needed. Additionally,
all known MUD profiles are present in memory. Therefore,
the space complexity heavily depends on the number of MUD
profiles being checked.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a suite of tools that allows
to automatically generate and formally verify IoT device
behavior and dynamically monitor IoT behavioral changes
in a network. We demonstrate using these tools how the
IETF MUD proposal can help reduce the effort needed to
dynamically identify and secure IoT devices.
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